Class formation, ideology and transition in Swaziland by Levin, Richard M
CLASS FORMATION, IDEOLOGY AND TRANSITION IN SYAZILAND 
by 
Richard M Levin 
Class Formation i n  Swaziland 
The appearance of c lass  socie ty  i n  Swaziland has been traced t o  the  pre-colonial 
period. (1) Here it is  argued t h a t  the t r ibu ta ry  re la t ionship  whereby a r i s t o c r a t s  
and chiefs were empowered t o  extract  surplus labour time from t h e i r  subjects through 
an "urnerno" (the summoning by a chief of his subjects t o  a work party),  along with 
t h e i r  control  over the  a l locat ion of land, gave r i s e  t o  the  formation of a c lass  of 
a r i s toc ra t s  comprising the monarchy, senior princes and chiefs ,  on the  one hand, and 
a c lass  of comnoners, on the  other  hand. Nevertheless, the a r r i v a l  of concession 
seekers and the penetration of the  cap i ta l  r e la t ion  i n  Swaziland following the  gold 
rush on the  Witwatersrand, transformed both the  s t ructure  of Swazi socie ty  and the  
t ra jectory  of the h i s t o r i c a l  process i n  Swaziland. The land p a r t i t i o n  of 1907 and 
i t s  subsequent implementation meant t h a t  vas t  numbers of Swazi found themselves 
al ienated from the land and were hence forced t o  seek wage-labour on t h e  Witwatersrand 
mines o r  on white farms, both i n  South Africa and i n  Swaziland. Increasingly, the  
c a p i t a l i s t  revolution i n  South Africa i n i t i a t e d  by the  mineral discoveries came t o  
rupture the reproductive cycle of pre-colonial society, and hence i ts  capacity t o  
sus ta in  i t s e l f  independently of the  development of capitalism i n  the region. 
During the ea r ly  phases of cap i ta l  penetration, the  pre-capital ist  ru l ing  
a l l iance therefore entered a period of c r i s i s .  Expropriation of Swazi land meant an 
erosion of t h e i r  bas is  of power, and i t  i s  i n  this l i g h t  t h a t  t h e i r  e a r l y  deputations 
and protestat ions t o  the B r i t i s h  colonial  author i t ies  must be seen. Their posit ion 
of dominance within the  Swazi formation w a s  fur ther  eroded by the establishment of a 
colonial  s t a t e  apparatus, f i r s t  Boer and l a t e r  Br i t i sh ,  which i n  the words of S i r  
Alfred Milner, the B r i t i s h  High Commissioner t o  South Africa, intended t o  
... deal with Swaziland as nearly as possible on the 
same l i n e s  as an ordinary d i s t r i c t  of the  Transvaal. (2) 
But, as l o c a l , s e t t l e r  cap i ta l  and South African cap i ta l ,  under the  aegis of 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, s t a r t ed  t o  compete fo r . l abour  power, the 
chiefs  and ar is tocracy began t o  assume a pivota l  r o l e  i n  t h i s  process. Here, the 
indigenous ru l ing  a l l i ance  stood between the unscrupulous labour rec ru i t e r s  and the  
labour market. Their acceptance of the  f i n a l i t y  of the  land p a r t i t i o n  i n  the face of 
the  f a i l u r e  of a l l  peaceful means of p ro tes t  w a s  expressed by Prince Malunge i n  1909: 
The land has been divided. We have no power t o  stop 
the  government o r  t o  say do not do th i s ;  but  all I 
say now i s  t h a t  the  p a r t i t i o n  i s  now finished,  i t  is  
done. The government knew t h a t  we did not l i k e  t h i s  
p a r t i t i o n  ... we have no power ... we wash our hand 
of the whole question. (3 )  
Henceforth, the Swazi aristocracy sought to restore their authority over 
the land within the framework of the land paxtition, that is through the acceptance, 
albeit unconscious, of the dominance of capitalist relations and their corresponding 
forms of ownership, by endeavouring to repurchase land lost to concessionaires and 
the crown. In its attempts to reconstitute itself as a hegemonic class within a 
transformed Swazi society, the Swazi aristocracy used its power as a withering pre- 
capitalist class in what can objectively be viewed as an attempt to foster a process 
of primitive accumulation. Accordingly, a £345 levy per head was set on all 
migrants to the South African mines by the aristocracy, and Queen Labotsibeni 
entered the payroll of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and was given 
£30 per month for her role in labour recruitment. The aristocracy had already been 
involved in local lldeals", so that in 1906 Swaziland Tin Limited entered into an 
agreement with Prince Malunge whereby the Prince supplied five hundred labourers to 
the company at 10 shillings per head. (4) Initial success led to the acquisition, I 
through repurchase, of 40,000 acres of crown land in 1914, to which Resident I 
Commissioner Coryndon acceded since I 
... it afforded the chiefs the satisfaction that they 
have accomplished some real good for their people 
without incurring the hostility of the administration. (5) 
Interestingly enough, Coryndon had already refused to consider other Swazi 1 
applicants without "any standing beyond the ordinary [sic] native" and in 1914 he 
awarded the Swazi Nation a "gift" of 28,000 acres of crown land on condition that 
future land transactions were made with the approval of the colonial state. But 
i 
these initial successes were short-lived, for in January 1915, Viscount Buxton, the 
new High Commissioner, began to regulate land transactions in a manner favouring 
hopean settler interests, a policy which persisted until the 1 9 4 0 ~ ~  Nevertheless, 
as indirect rulers of the colonial state, the aristocracy and chiefs were able to 
inaugurate the Swaziland National Fund (sNF), which drew in a share of certain taxes 
and, during the later stages of colonialism, the proceeds of all fees and fines in 
the Swazi courts. The SNF was subsequently transformed into the Swaziland National 
Treasury, which by the '60s boasted of a £70,000 annual revenue from which the King, 
Queen Mother and chiefs drew their wages. (6) 
When the King's power to appoint and dismiss chiefs was withdrawn in 1941, 
King Sobhuza, who had ascended the throne in 1922, sent a petition to King George V I  
in which complaints were made on the land question. The result was that a Colonial 
Development and Welfare Grant of £140,000 was advanced to buy 135,000 acres of land, 
while a further 216,000 acres of crown land were designated for Swazi use. Interesting 
to note is that this land, which came to form the Land Settlement Scheme, although 
officially classified as Swazi land under the control of the Kinkin-council, was 
allocated outside the indigenous pre-capitalist system of land allocation. These 
early attempts at the development of individual smallholder plots were not very 
successful, however, and in 1946 29,000 acres of the land was provided for the 
establishment of Peak Timbers. A new trend was set in motion, and in 1945 a large 
ranch was purchased, following a general cattle collection. (7) This led to the 
relaunching of a general levy in 1946 to buy land and the formal establishment of the 
Lifa Fund by the aristocracy and their allies through the £5 or one ox levied on every 
male adult. Under these efforts, Swazi Nation Land made advances and by 1960 had come 
to constitute 53.25 per cent of the total surface of the country, as ag&nst 35.75 per 
cent after the 1907 proclanatios. (8) Maladministration and charges of abuse through 
corruption (9) led to the disintegration of the Lifa Fund project, although it was 
renewed afresh in the form of Tibiyo Takangwane in the post-Independence period. 
These historical processes gave rise to the transformation of the class 
structure of Swazi society whereby the alliance of aristocrats and chiefs steadily 
attempted to locate themselves within the complex of capitalist relations. Current 
analysis has placed much emphasis on the "unique characterf1 of the Swazi post-colonial 
state form and the dominance of the llSwazi rulers" as the class in command of the state 
apparatus. Thus Daniel, following Fransman, has asserted that at independence state 
power was assumed not by class forces within the capitalist mode but by the 
"traditional rulers" from the non-capitalist mode, who lacked, moreover, an$ material 
base in the "capitalist sector". (10) 
It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the conceptualisation of 
class structure and the process of ideological practice. Classes are identifiable 
at a structural level through the insertion of individual subjects in the process of 
production. However, class practices are influenced by a complex combination of 
ideological connotations. Hence, while on the surface the dominant class in Swazi 
post-colonial society may appear to be the "Swazi ruling class", their class 
belonging must be traced to their location in the production process. Since the 
production and reproduction processes in Swaziland, and hence the social structure 
itself, during the colonial and post-colonial periods have been dominated by 
capitalism, the class structure of Swaziland must be conceptualised in relation to 
the capitalist mode of production. (11) During the twentieth century, the Swazi 
ruling alliance has had to transcend its class determination within pre-capitalist 
society and consolidate a material base within the capitalist production process. 
Winter has argued that higher productivity through the development of the forces of 
production on Swazi Nation Land partially offset the smaller mount of labour time 
which the Swazi aristocracy and chiefs could extract from their subjects. (12) . 
Moreover, it can be argued that the tendency for capitalist relations to arise on 
Swazi Nation Land favoured the aristocracy and chiefs both through their control over 
land allocation as well as through the cash they received as tax collectors and 
indirect rulers of the colonial state. 
Hence the colonial period witnessed the emergence through transition of 
the pre-capitalist ruling alliance (although this does not preclude the inclusion of 
commoners as well), a petty-bourgeoisie of owner-peasants whose surplus money and 
means of subsistence secured an annual supply over and above that which was needed 
for their own reproduction. Yet, as Mao Tse Tung has argued, this class constantly 
desires to transform itself into an independent bourgeoisie (13) - precisely because 
it is a transitional class. Noteworthy in the case of the erstwhile dominant class in 
pre-capitalist Swazi society is that certain cornprador characteristics were revealed. 
Initially, these were repressed through the large-scale alienation of Swazi Nation 
Land, but in the post-World War I1 period, after the British had established a more 
conventional form of indirect rule (14), elements of the emergent petty-bourgeoisie 
increasingly became "vassals of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon 
imperialism for their existence and development" (15), marking their transition to a 
more overtly comprador role. This is not revealed exclusively in the transformation 
of the SNF into the Swazi National Treasury, but as capital penetration under the 
aegis of British and South African capital intensified a new trend which was set in 
the '60s proved to be none other than the precursor of the familiar pattern of the 
post-independence conjuncture. In 1962, for example, the Usutu Pulp Company bought 
up two small areas which the Commonwealth Development Corporation (cIC) had initially 
afforested for the "Swazi Nation", in return for which the latter acquired a E50,000 
interest in the company. (16) For Taylor (17), this reveals a specific level of 
comprador accumulation whereby the material basis of this faction of capital is 
formed by a "joint investment with foreign capital in units producing for export". 
State, Tibiyo and the Development of the Comprador Bourwoisie 
Control over the state apparatus by this embryonic faction of capital under the 
leadership of King Sobhuza I1 in the post-independence period considerably strengthened 
their hand. State-directed accumulation was thereby ensured not to run counter to, 
but rather to complement, comprador accumulation: indeed, the latter, through the 
establishment of Tibiyo Takangwsme,soon came to eclipse the former. Initially 
established following the reinvestment of mineral ri&ts with the King "in trust for 
the nation", enshrined in the independence constitution of 1968, the first Tibiyo 
committee appointed by the King and entrusted with the task of administering the fund 
soon realised that more finance was required than royalties and mineral fees could 
provide. Henceforth, the committee embarked on a policy of joint investment with 
foreign capital and the acquisition of shares in major companies. Strategies were 
formulated to obtain loan arrangements with potential foreign investment partners, 
and, following negotiations involving United Nations and Commonwealth-backed legal 
assistance, deals were clinched with Lonhro, Tamer and Newall, and Spa Holdings. (18) 
The cash flow that followed enabled Tibiyo to enter the field of land purchase and 
development. Despite the fact that, at an ideological level, the land purchased is 
said to be "held in trust" for the nation, the relations of production and exchange 
prevalent on such land are those of capitalism. In 1976, the King decreed that 
royalty fees previously received by Tibiyo were henceforth to be transferred to a 
new organisation called Tisuka Takqane. Thereafter, Tibiyo's activities were to 
be financed by its commercial and agricultural investments, through dividend 
payments from its shareholdings and other income generated through these projects. 
Tibiyoqs funds have been spent on land purchases, share acquisitions and commercial 
and agricultural investments. The latter accounts for the largest expenditure, 
where millions are invested annually to secure revenue. The Tibiyo financial report 
of accumulated funds for 1981 revealed a total of E46,071 and reported income for 
l 
1978/9 was E9.4 million, of which E9.3 million accrued from dividends. (19) King 
Sobhuza has said that I l 
Tibiyo is neither a competitor, nor the duplicate of 
government's activities and programmes, but a 
complementary organisation to fill some gaps [sic] I 
left behind by colonial rule, and to give hand to the 
government in the great task of nation building. (20) I 
I 
1 
The recent appointment of Tibiyots managing director, Dr Sihayi Nxuude, as 
Minister of Finance has led to attempts to bring development agency status to Tibiyo, 
a move which will no doubt enhance Tibiyofs capacity to secure loans and finance. ~ 
Increasingly, the activities of Tibiyo are poised to achieve a partial break from I 
their total dependence on foreign capital and thereby launch a more nationally l 
directed, albeit dependent, process of capital accumulation. The development of the 
Third Sugar Mill, "Simunye" , where for the first time Tibiyo and the state jointly 
held majority equity, has heralded a new era in capital accumulation in Swaziland. 
Indications are that an emergent indigenous bourgeoisie has now accumulated 
sufficient capital to employ labour productively and to launch further ventures as 
majority equity holders under the aegis of foreign multinational capital. This is 
substantiated by more recent developments, such as the establishment of the Tibiyo 
Strawberry Fruit plantation in Malkerns, which aims to supply Swaziland Fruit 
Processing Plant Corporation with 2,000 tonnes of fresh strawberries, the Langa 
National Brick Works, which has provided the base for an extended ceramics industry, 
and the operation of an Angora goat-breeding scheme for the development of a mohair 
industry. 
The so-called land deal (21) with South Africa can also be viewed as an 
attempt by the comprador bourgeoisie to develop their autonomy as a national 
capitalist class. It is here that the contradictory nature of the path taken by 
comprador accumulation, as a transitionary phase in the development of a national 
bourgeoisie, is revealed. It is likely that elements of the comprador have been 
frustrated by their incapacity to overcome their contradictory role of commitment to 
industrialisation with a concurrent restricted internal market and limited demand 
secured through the conservation of a highly unproductive system of land termre to 
maintain low wages. Yet it is at the same time the reproduction of the latter which 
has been seminal in securing ideological legitimacy for the hegemony of the . 
comprador. In order to burst through the restraints imposed by comprador 
accumulation, the emergent Swazi national bourgeoisie believe that the independent 
port of Kosi Bay (from South ~frica) will enable them to unshackle themselves from 
the South African Customs Union and hence allow for their unfettered accumulation 
through the protection of local industries, the restriction of imported commodities, 
which, added to the control they exercise over any developments of capitalism in 
agriculture, would greatly strengthen their hands. 
The foregoing developments have not, however, occurred unproblematically, 
but have unfolded in the midst of successive struggles and crises. The precise 
manner in which the unity of Swazi society has been secured and the crucial role of 
pre-capitalist political and ideological practices therein, forms the subject of the 
subsequent section of our exposition. But, before proceeding, it is necessary to 
stress that there is no instrumental transposition of class categories developed 1 
in our previous analysis: membership of the royal Dlamini or any chiefly clan does 
not denote petty bourgeois or comprador class belonging; nor does bourgeois in any 
way suggest membership of a royal or chiefly clan. 
Class Struggle and Ideolopv in Colonial and Post-Colonial Swaziland 
The problem facing this analysis now is to demonstrate how the penetration and 
domination of capitalist relations in Swaziland have been predicated upon the 
evolution of new, as well as the conservation of existing, political, economic and 
ideological practices which contribute to the reproduction of the relations of class 
domination and subordination implicit in capitalist relations of production. While 
the dominant contradiction at the level of mode of production - the struggle between 
workers and capitalists at the point of production - constitutes the decisive and 
distinctive terrain of class struggle, struggles do manifest themselves in a variety 
of forms which are articulated in vaxious ways with this overarching social 
contradiction. In his formulation of a theory of populism, Ernesto Laclau has 
developed the notion of the "relative continuity of popular traditions", which he 
contrasts with the "historical discontinuities which characterise class 
structures". (22) He has also argued that 
... the process of social reproduction is not just the 
reproduction of the dominant mode of production but 
also of its conditions, one of which is ideology; and 
that the greater the importance in a social formation 
of those sectors which do not participate directly in 
dominant production relations, the greater will be the 
importance ... of ideological processes for social 
reproduction as a whole. ( 2 3 )  
The point at issue for imperialist Britain on the eve of decolonisation 
was how to effect a smooth transition to independence in Swaziland. Such a 
transition would best be effected by a class or faction thereof which muld bring 
about ideological unity in the society by articulating its ideological practice 
outside the domain of antagonisms arising from the dominant relations of production. 
The popular ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie faction spearheaded by the King 
relied heavily on the concept, of "tradition", which served to mystify the essential 
contradiction in the Swazi society posed at the level of mode of production by 
capitalist relations of exploitation. Hence,in the build-up to independence, the 
chief antagonism appeared to shift on to the political and ideological terrains, 
thus taking the form of a contradiction purely between the colonial state and the 
mass of the Swazi people. The popular democratic ideology of "tradition" through 
its appeal to the mass of the Swazi people, based on Swazi Nation Land, ensured 
that the essential antagonism of capital remained extraneous to the field of 
political and ideological struggle that now shifted its centre of gravity towards 
the resuscitation of popular traditions. These themselves 
. .. are the residue of unique and irreducible historical 
experiences, and as such, constitute a more solid and 
durable structure of meanings than the social structure 
itself. (24) 
In this way, the intrinsic quality of the conflict has been mystified, 
and indeed continues to be mystified. The maintenance of specific non-capitalist 
practices has ensured the continuity required by capital in general for sustained 
accumulation and expansion, in so far as the transitional bourgeois alliance of the 
King has thus far proved itself capable of diffusing class struggles through the 
reproduction of elements of pre-capitalist Swazi society. Particularly crucial here 
is the leverage which the King has exercised over the peasantry and semi-proletariat 
based on Swazi Nation Land - and the pre-colonial system of land tenure constitutes 
an important aspect of that influence - since, if they were to be drawn into an 
alliance with a proletariat that has shown itself capable of extra-legal strike 
action, the consequences could prove ominous for the role of capital. 
Indeed, the build-up to independence witnessed a series of workersq 
struggles in the early 1960s. (25) The climax was reached in 1963, when a 2,500 
strong strike of sugar plantation workers in the Big Bend area was followed by the 
biggest strike in Swazi history thus far, in May 1963, at the Turner and Newall 
controlled asbestos mine in Bulembu in the North-West region of the country. After 
Mbabane workers had registered their solidarity by engaging in a mass stay-away, 
the British Government decided to send in a contingent of the Gordon Highlanders 
stationed in Kenya to stem the tide of worker militancy. When the King sent a 
representative to Mbabane to urge striking men and women back to work, he was 
ignored, as were his pleas to workers in Bulembu: the crisis had revealed that 
both the "traditional authority" and the colonial state were incapable of diff'using 
the volatile situation without recourse to a huge show of force. It also demonstrated 
the ambiguous role of the King vis-L-vis the workers and the colonial state: 
When the strike spread, the administration vainly 
asked the Ngwenyama to provide men from his royal 
'regiments' to protect workers against intimidation. 
And when the British troops arrived, the workers 
appealed just as vainly to the Ngwenyama to 
intercede with the authorities on their behalf. (25) 
But, nevertheless, certain sections of capital had been impressed by the King's 
hostile reaction to the workers, as were several colonial administrators. 
Ironically, it was under the influence of Van Wyk de Vries, a prominent South 
African Broederbonder and lawyer, that the King was persuaded to form a political 
party which became known as the "Imbokodvo" National Movement. (27) "Imbokodvo", 
which means a hard, compact crushing stone, stood for the "continuance of the 
monarchy, Swazi customs, mineral and land rights, and the prerogative of the 
Ngwenyamatt. (28) In May 1964, in the build-up to the first "democratic" elections 
in Swaziland, a joint delegation from the Swazi Democratic Party, the Ngwane 
National Liberatory Congress and the Swaziland Progressive Party produced a 
memorandum for presentation to the Colonial Secretary, in which they expressed their 
grave fears in connection with the formulation of the new party: 
The new party is in a position to use directly or 
indirectly the financial resources of the various 
organs of the tribal authority and to exert on our 
predominantly rural population various forms of 
pressure and intimidation stemming from the control 
of land allocation by the chiefs. (29) 
Amidst further desperate unheeded chaxges of coercion and abuse of power by the 
chiefs from the opposition parties, the Imbokodvo Movement gained crushing victories 
in both the 1964 and the 1967 pre-independence elections. Yet,'it was precisely the 
decisive influence which this faction of the petty-bourgeois politicians wielded 
over the overwhelming majority of the peasantry on Swazi Nation Land that rendered 
them indispensable to the needs of foreign and local settler capitalists, who were 
all too keen to throw the strength of their financial backing behind them. Prominent 
Afrikaner Nationalists like Dr Donges were invited in the mid-1960s by Car1 Todd, a 
local settler with business interests in South Africa, to visit the King, and two 
influential ministers, including future Prime Minister John Voster, visited the King 
at his hunting lodge on the eve of the foundation of the Imbokodvo movement. While 
the actual contents of the discussions were never revealed, they were followed by 
repeated broadcasts over South Africa Radio by Todd, pleading for support for the 
Imbokodvo party and appeals for South African state support for the economic 
development of Swaziland. (30) 
The o ~ l y  serious challenge to Imbokodvo hegemony came from the Ngwane 
National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), under the leadership of Dr Ambrose Zwane, who 
pursued a more "socialist" orientated populism coloured by an "Africanist" rhetoric, 
and whose appeal was extended to workers, peasants and radical sections of the petty 
bouq-poisie alike. Indeed, it was prominent members of this pasty like Prince Dumisa 
Dlamini who were instrumental in fostering the development of trade unionism and in 
facilitating the organisation that eventually saw the 1963 worker strikes spreading 
throughout the country. A press release by the NNLC on the eve of the independence 
elections claimed that: 
The NNLC is a party that draws its authority and its 
authenticity from the masses of the people ... we are 
a party of dedicated freedom fighters determined to 
bring freedom and independence to the country . . . 
[~bokodvo] is a pawn of international imperialism, a 
red tool of white settlerism and an undemocratic 
organisation whose struggle is not indigenous [sic] 
and therefore inimical to the attainment of national 
independence. 
Fransman (31) has demonstrated how the real standard of living of the 
majority of workers in the private sector declined during the post-independence 
period, so that more than 50 per cent of the total labour force employed in the 
private sector was faced with either constant or declining wages over and above a 
6 per cent increase in the retail price index for unskilled workers. This would ' 
help to account for the ascent of Dr Zwanel s NNLC which won the Mpumalanga 
constituency, giving it three seats in the House of Assembly in the 1972 General 
Election. Noteworthy is the fact that this constituency contained a high proportion 
of sugas plantation and estate workers from the Lubombo sugar belt. Shortly after 
the elections, however, Thomas Ngwenya, one of the victorious Congress MPS, was 
deported to South Africa as an "undesirable citizen1', a move that was successfully 
reversed in the High Court. Nevertheless, Ngwenya was subsequently rearrested and 
restricted, and the Swazi parliament passed an amendment to the Immigration Act which 
established a Tribunal of five members elected by the Deputy Prime Minister to deal 
with "citizenship disputes". In March 1973, the Swaziland Court of appeal dissolved 
the Act as unconstitutional. As Dr Ambrose Zwane himself had stated in Parliament on 
13 November 1972, 
This House here has no power to make laws that are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. That is 
according to the constitution. (32) 
Nevertheless, on 12 April 1973 the King, an erstwhile constitutional monarch of the 
independence Westminster-type constitution, assumed power while suspending the 
constitution. Special detention powers were given to the King-in-Council, where the 
latter comprised five members of the cabinet. 
Fransman has attributed these changes to the growing contradiction between 
capital and labour. Hence, shortly before the constitution was repealed, in early 
April, a strike broke out at Havelock as workers demanded a 30 per cent increase and 
cash in lieu of food rations. This strike took place shortly after Tibiyo had 
acquired 40 per cent of the mine's equity from Turner and Newdl, thus aiding and 
abetting a specifically comprador type of accumulation. Indeed, as Fransman has 
argued, this strike took place against a background of sharp worker militancy in 
South Africa which saw roughly 100,000 workers involved in strikes originating in the 
Durban axea in 1973. But, while accurately observing that the moves undertaken by 
the King and the comprador bourgeoisie, which included the banning of all political 
parties, could not in themselves remove the antagonisms implicit in the dominant 
social relations, E%ansmants analysis does not go far enough in elucidating how the 
comprador bourgeoisie aimed to neutralise these antagonisms at the ideological level 
of Swazi society. Thus, while capitalist relations of exploitation underlay these 
major changes in the Swazi state, it is necessary to specify more rigorously their 
combination and articulation with political and ideological developments. 
Firstly, we should note that, while popular democratic ideologies do not 
necessarily have a discourse of their own, and can exist only in articulation with 
the ideological realms of the fundamental contradiction arising out of the dominant 
production relations, i.e. within bourgeois or working-class discourses, they can be 
articulated by intermediate classes - at least in so far as peripheral societies like 
Swaziland are concerned. (33) What the petty-bourgeois radicalism of Dr Zwanefs 
Congress Party and the King! s Imbokodvo National Movement had in common was their 
appeal to nationalism and national sentiment, which have no class connections when 
considered in isolation. Thus, whereas the latter limited nationalism to the 
retention of a hierarchical,authoritarian,hereditary,pre-capitalist power structure, 
the former established this link through a vocally more anti-European, Africanist, 
socialist type of rhetoric which enabled it to mobilise worker support in various 
parts of the country. What King Sobhuza and his advisers were able to do was to 
develop the ~tate/~eo~le antagonism through a popular ideology that blocked its 
orientation and development in any revolutionary direction. The legitimising basis 
for the King's drastic actions was provided by the ideological raw materials of pre- 
capitalist Swazi society, so that the constitution was deemed unfit for the "Swazi 
way" of life. This ideological distortion facilitated a restructuring of the state 
form to allow for what was in effect becoming a highly repressive form of populism 
through which an appeal was made to the people to abandon elements of what had 
become the dominant ideology - bourgeois ideology. Hence the King noted that 
... the constitution has permitted the imposition into 
our country of highly undesirable political practices, 
alien and incompatible with the way of life of our 
society, and designed to disrupt and destroy our own 
peacefil and constructive and essentially democratic 
method of political activity: increasingly this 
element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in 
our peacefil society. (34) 
This did not imply a wholesale abandonment of bourgeois ideology, but rather involved 
an attempt by the King to combine a disparity of perceptions of the world in a way 
that would serve to neutralise potential antagonisms. This became concretised in his 
well known conception of the idea that the Swazis should adopt the best of both 
European and Swazi worlds and culture. This, of course, in practice merely served 
to maintain the settler/mltinational alliance with the compradors in the light of 
the generalised social crisis which revealed the post-colonial statets limitations 
in abrogating the frustrations of the dominated classes. The dominant alliance 
required a greater flexibility in dealing with such crises.and the structures of the 
Westminster-type state proved to be too rigid to secure the conditions of existence 
of capitalist relations, which in peripheral capitalist societies such as Swaziland 
require a high mass and rate of surplus value extraction and that have 
characteristically resulted in the emergence of the state as a highly antagonistic 
force with respect to the mass of the population. In Parliament, Prime Minister 
Prince Makhosini Dlamini said that 
Many unwazranted restrictions are placed on the executive 
powers of ministers and of the King-in-council resulting 
in the incapacity of the executive to govern the country 
properly and without continuously encountering irksome 
and completely unjustified obstacles. (35) 
It was, furthermore, of little surprise when the Minister of Finance, R P Stevens, 
gave countenance to the King's actions, claiming that: 
Swaziland was on the brink of severe industrial strife 
as a result of the activities of politicians, political 
parties and outside influences which had contacts 
financially and otherwise with countries such as Russia 
and Tanzania. The position was becoming unbearable and 
the King acted quickly effectively and timeously. (36)  
Henceforth, the King ruled by decree - all legislative, executive and 
political power was invested in his name and was exercised by a council of ministers. 
The task of drawing up a new constitution "more suited to and compatible with the 
Swazi way of life" was entrusted to a Royal Constitutional Commission. Their 
problems were compounded by the fact that the pre-capitalist Swazi state on whose 
"model" the new constitution was to be based had arisen and articulated a tributary 
relation, whereas the state of the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  no matter what form it took, was 
irretractably saddled with the imperatives of the capital re1ation.h its complex 
articulation with the totality of Swazi society. Thus, when the "Establishment of 
the Parliament of Swaziland" was announced under the King's Order in Council No 28 
of 1978, mch of the institutional appaxatus of the state remained unchanged and 
continued t o  function unimpeded. The aims of the  reformed s t a t e  were t o  ensure 
tha t  the domination of the comprador bourgeoisie remained unchallenged even i f  tliis 
enta i led  the  deployment of the administrative s t a t e  apparatuses against  t h e i r  own 
c lass  a l l i e s .  Executive power w a s  vested i n  the King, who appointed the Prime 
Minister from amongst the e lected o r  appointed members of the  House of Assembly 
along with the remaining cabinet members. The compradors fur ther  ensured t h e i r  
dominance through a reformed e lec to ra l  procedure whereby the country w a s  divided on 
the bas is  of regional committees o r  "Tinkhundla", o r ig ina l ly  established by the 
colonial author i t ies  a f t e r  World W a r  I1 a s  a loca l  government i n i t i a t i v e .  Elections 
have since 1978 amounted t o  the se lect ion of an 80-member (two from each "inkhundlatt, 
who were themselves nominees announced on the morning of "electionstt - allegedly t o  
prevent p o l i t i c a l  campaigning) e lectora l  college, which i s  then swmoned t o  the 
Royal c a t t l e  byre t o  e l e c t  20 members t o  the  House of Assembly by "secret  bal lo t" ,  
while a fur ther  10 a re  nominated by the monarch. The Senate comprises 20 members, 
10 of whom are  nominated by the  King o r  the Queen Mother, with the remainder being 
appointed by the House of Assembly. 
What has changed, therefore,  i s  not so much the form of the  s t a t e  but the 
mode of representation. Here p o l i t i c a l  forces representing i n t e r e s t s  which a re  
rooted both i n  the division of labour as well as i n  the complex of c i v i l  society 
have established ins t i tu t iona l i sed  channels of access t o  the  s t a t e  apparatuses 
which axe recognised as  legit imate by ce r ta in  relevant branches of the s t a t e  and 
sectors of Swazi society. Hence, i n  June 1982, on the eve of h i s  death, the King 
established a new, powerful policy-making body which was cal led  the Supreme Council 
of Sta te ,  comprising several  of h i s  appointees. I n  e f fec t ,  t h i s  served t o  formalise 
the "liqoqo", which was t o  replace the council of ministers through which the  King 
had hi ther to  exercised power. Significantly,  no mention w a s  made of the  "libandlatl 
which had played an extremely s ignif icant  r o l e  as a pre-capi ta l is t  form of democratic 
expression. Indeed, the "libandla" was a crucia l  moment of the pre-capi ta l is t  
iden t i f i ca t ion  between the s t a t e  and c i v i l  society, since i t  included any Swazi 
adult  male, an iden t i f i ca t ion  which had permanently been ruptured by t. e penetration 
and subsequent dominance of capitalism i n  Swaziland. "Traditionalu authority,  i n  
e f fec t  along with pre-capi ta l is t  ideological  practice,  has i n  t h i s  way become 
progressively estranged from the  mass of the  people i n  whose name it i s  enforced. 
A s  ea r ly  as 1965, Jack Halpern could write: 
... today ... Sobhuza i s  probably out of touch with the l 
problems of the rural Swazi, f o r  i n  the forty-three ~ l 
years of h i s  re ign the broad popular base of national 
par t ic ipat ion i n  the f l iband la f  has withered away. (37) l l 
It has been under the guise of popular t r ad i t ion  t h a t  the King has spear- 
headed an emergent bourgeoisie who have consolidated t h e i r  material  bas i s  and 
p o l i t i c a l  power through a modified s t a t e  form designed both t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e i r  
fu r the r  accumulation and t o  secure the i n t e r e s t s  of s ignif icant  sections of t h e i r  
c lass  a l l i e s .  The l a t t e r ,  i n  turn,  have come t o  believe t h a t  t h e i r  own conditions 
of existence and accumulation have been safeguarded through the ideological  
d is tor t ions  which f a c i l i t a t e d  the Kingfs seizure of absolute power and subsequent 
manoeuvres of h i s  own and h i s  indigenous c lass  e l i t e s ,  inasmuch as these served t o  
guarantee both the conditions of existence and the reproduction of the  cap i ta l  
re la t ion.  
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis has attempted t o  show how the transformation of ideology has 
been achieved a s  an e f fec t  of ideological  struggles as opposed simply t o  the e f f o r t s  
of d i f fe ren t  c lasses  t o  a r t i c u l a t e  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  t o  the mass of the Swazi people. 
It has been an intermediate c l a s s  i n  the process of i t s  own formation, the King and 
h i s  petty-bourgeois followers who, during the  build up t o  independence and beyond, 
were increasingly able t o  a r t i c u l a t e  national popular i n t e r e s t s  and hence secure 
t h e i r  own legitimacy within Swazi society. A t  the  same time, developments at the  
economic level saw the material transformation of this petty bourgeoisie into the 
embryo of a national bourgeoisie via a route of comprador accurm;llation. In this 
way, popular ideology became both the subject and the object of the emergent 
bourgeoisie: it was both inscribed within and autonomous from their process of 
transformation in so fas as it has arisen both within the specific field of class 
struggle emanating directly from the dominant relations of pre-colonial Swaziland 
and been produced as an effect of struggles for hegemony arising out of the people/ 
state antagonism in the build up to independence and the post-colonial period. 
An article of this length has obviously been able to delineate only an 
extremely limited number of issues and complex problems relating to the complexity 
of the structure and transformation of Swazi society, as well as to the concrete 
development of the historical process in Swaziland. Many loose stones have been 
left unturned and only the first steps have been taken towards a more rigorous 
formulation of the concept of class and the notion of ideology in Swaziland, and 
their specificity. Notable in its absence is a comprehensive discussion of the 
development of the Swazi capital/labour relation and its articulation with politics 
and ideology. Much emphasis has been given to the manner in which the emergent Swazi 
bourgeoisie have maintained a "traditionaltt appearance through their recourse to 
pre-capitalist ideology in the interests of their own hegemony and accumulation. 
But Swazi workers themselves have already scraped away the "muck of agestt surrounding 
the mysterious aura of the emergent bourgeoisie. In June 1982, 400 workers at the 
strife-torn Luphohlo project in the Ezulwini Valley, undertaken by Wimpey 
International to develop a hyrdo-electric dam, went on strike demanding the 
reinstatement of their representative, Zabulon Tsabede, who had been fired following 
an earlier dispute. When confronted by the Labour Commissioner, the District 
Commissioner for Hhohho, and a senior police superintendent who ordered them to 
return to work, leave everything to the works committee (36) and cease behaving in 
an "unSwazi manner", the workers replied: 
Is it Swazi to intimidate workers and treat a committee 
member like this? ... What have the white men given 
you up there in those offices? ... you can't force us 
to work ... why can't you people negotiate with us? 
Why do you have to rely on threats all the time? Is 
that the Swazi way you are telling us about? (39) 
Eventually the workers were defeated and Wimpey resumed normal operations, but in 
the heat of the reality of the exploitative relation and the political forms of 
state interventions, along with the various interpellations used to overcome the 
strike, the workers' statements reveal that the ideological veils used to secure 
these ends have begun to wear thin. 
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